Planet of the APs: Reflections on the Scale of Law and Its Users by Galanter, Marc
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 53 Number 5 Article 2 
1-1-2006 
Planet of the APs: Reflections on the Scale of Law and Its Users 
Marc Galanter 
University of Wisconsin-Madison 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Marc Galanter, Planet of the APs: Reflections on the Scale of Law and Its Users, 53 Buff. L. Rev. 1369 
(2006). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol53/iss5/2 
This James McCormick Mitchell Lecture is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an 
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact 
lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 53 SPECIAL EDITION 2006 NUMBER 5
2005 JAMES McCORMICK MITCHELL LECTURE
Planet of the APs:
Reflections on the Scale of Law and its Userst
MARc GALANTERtt
[O]ne can no more predict the outcome of a case from the facts and
the law than one can predict the outcome of a game of chess from
the positions of the pieces and the rules of the game. In either
case, one needs to know who is playing.
Lynn M. LoPucki & Walter 0. Weyrauch1
t The James McCormick Mitchell Lecture, University at Buffalo Law School,
April 18, 2005. The themes of this lecture have been percolating with me
intermittently for a number of years. I am indebted to the Mitchell Lecture
committee for providing an opportunity to bring it to long-postponed fruition
and to Jim Wooten for his bountiful assistance in the run-up to the lecture. I am
grateful to the participants in several workshops and seminars at various
institutions. I would like to mention particularly the helpfulness of Stephen M.
Bainbridge and the excellent research assistance of William B. Turner. © 2006
by Marc Galanter.
tt John and Rylla Bosshard Professor Emeritus of Law and South Asian
Studies, University of Wisconsin-Madison; Centennial Professor, London School
of Economics and Political Science. E-mail: msgalant@wisc.edu.
1. A Theory of Legal Strategy, 49 DUKE L.J. 1405, 1472 (2000).
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I. THE ASCENT OF THE APS
Our human world is populated by several kinds of
creatures: the most familiar are we natural, biological,
individual humans. But the world also contains artificial
"corporate" actors. Blackstone sums up the distinction
neatly:
Natural persons are such as the God of nature formed us: artificial
are such as are created and devised by human laws for the
purposes of society and government; which are called corporations
or bodies politic. 2
In the course of a typical day each of us consumes the
products and employs the services of innumerable
corporations, which supply us with foodstuffs, medications,
television programs, and books as well as telephones,
automobiles, insurance, banking services, and on and on.
My normal progress through the day would be unsustain-
able without these creatures that routinely deliver
unimaginable prodigies of organization and performance.
These corporate creatures or artificial persons (APs) are one
of humanity's great inventions. They have proved a tool for
complex and coordinated action of a scale, consistency, and
perseverance vastly beyond the range of biological
individuals or informal groupings.
But these creatures are more than passive instruments
serving our needs and desires. Their presence changes our
world and it changes us. Like Dr. Frankenstein's creation,
2. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *119.
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they both reflect and escape from the purposes of their
creators. I propose to examine the way that the growing
presence of APs affects the character of our legal world,
especially its institutions of civil justice.
Before moving to these questions it may be helpful to
address in a preliminary way the question of the "reality" of
APs. In what sense are APs entities that can act and can
pursue interests or goals? A great deal of energy has been
expended in theorizing about the nature of the corporation:
The terminology differs, but the basic controversy is over
whether a corporation is (1) a merely nominal entity; (2) a
group or partnership of natural persons (NPs); (3) a natural
entity or "person" in its own right. Over time the third has
come to predominate in official and popular usage. 3
The personhood of the corporation is denied by a theory
popular among academics which regards the corporation as
a nexus or web of explicit and implicit contracts. 4 "The
description of the corporation as a nexus of contracts not
only de-personalizes the corporation, it denies that there is
any body there at all .... [I]t denies that there is anything
distinctive out there to regulate. All there are are natural
people engaged in their own individualized wealth-
maximizing activities."5 In the nexus view, reference to
corporations as actors is a fiction or reification. 6 But the
equal and opposite sin to reification is reductionism.
Applying the same analysis, is not a contract merely a
nexus of expectations, which in turn are nexuses of
perceptions, and so forth? Why are contracts more
fundamental building blocks of the "real" than
3. See Morton J. Horwitz, Santa Clara Revisited: The Development of
Corporate Theory, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 173 (1985); Carl J. Mayer, Personalizing the
Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 577 (1990);
Sanford A. Schane, The Corporation is a Person: The Language of a Legal
Fiction, 61 TUL. L. REV. 563 (1987).
4. See Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 11 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 99, 99-100 (1989); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, The
Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1426 (1989).
5. David Millon, Personifying the Corporate Body, 2 GRAVEN IMAGES 116, 123
(1995).
6. For a richer view of corporations as political entities with law-making and
law-applying capacities, see Dalia Tsuk, From Pluralism to Individualism:
Berle and Means and 20th-Century American Legal Thought, 30 LAw & Soc.
INQUIRY 179 (2005).
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corporations? Or than the law of California, for that matter,
which is after all just a nexus of expectations about what
courts and other officials will do? Are corporations to be
singled out for deconstructive treatment that could be
applied equally to all institutions? To show that something
is made up of constituent elements is not much of a trick.
The question is not, it seems to me, what corporations
"really" are, but whether it makes sense to address entities
at this level for the purposes of assigning entitlements and
fashioning controls.
Like the common law tradition, ordinary English
speech concurs in attributing a distinct moral status to
corporations: analysis of linguistic usage shows that
''extension of human properties to corporate bodies is woven
into the very fabric of language. ' 7 While the use of
physiological references in connection with institutions is
taken as metaphoric or metonymic, "cognitive verbs and
many activity words, when used with institutional nouns,
have precisely the same meanings that they have with
person nouns. '8
[NIouns such as "corporation" occupy their own special class.
Institutional nouns have unique properties. First, although
physiological verbs, in their literal senses, are inappropriate with
them, cognitive verbs reign supreme. So far as language is
concerned, institutions do not have bodies-they indeed are
incorporeal and intangible-but they certainly do have minds.
They think and they feel and they say. Next, there are many
activity verbs that are compatible with, and literally applicable to,
institutional nouns, so that, linguistically, the institutions are
viewed as competent to perform the designated acts. To be sure,
language does not regard institutions as fully human, but it does
impute important human characteristics to them-mentalities and
the ability to pursue social activities. As a consequence, language
treats the ensuing thoughts and actions as belonging to the
institutions themselves-and not to the hidden members. This
perspective from language turns out to be most congenial to the
personal [i.e., entity] theory of corporate personality. 9
7. Schane, supra note 3, at 594-95.
8. Id. at 606.
9. Id. at 607.
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That corporations are regarded as actors in their own
right does not imply that moral standing equivalent to that
of natural persons need be attributed to them. Nor are they
necessarily regarded as the bearers of equal legal rights
and responsibilities. For example, researchers describe
jurors holding corporations to higher standards of respon-
sibility in keeping with their greater perceived capacity to
foresee and prevent harm.10
In other ways, too, APs may be more complete or
competent persons. To a far greater extent than natural
persons, APs may be capable of acting in the purposeful,
rational, calculating fashion that the legal system prefers to
ascribe to actors." James Coleman describes APs as less
susceptible to the lapses of willpower that are endemic to
the activities of natural persons. 12 Chris Guthrie suggests
that institutional litigants, "repeat players with active
caseloads who are likely to view litigation primarily as a
financial matter," are less likely than NPs to be emotionally
disabled by "regret aversion" in pursuing litigation.13 But
APs suffer their own distinctive infirmities (what
sociologists might label "goal displacement" and economists
might view as "agency problems") that impede the optimal
pursuit of their corporate interests or goals. These include
the concealment or distortion of information as it flows up
10. See VALERIE P. HANS, BUSINESS ON TRIAL: THE CIVIL JURY AND CORPORATE
RESPONSIBILITY (2000); Robert J. MacCoun, Differential Treatment of Corporate
Defendants by Juries: An Examination of the "Deep-Pockets" Hypothesis, 30 LAW
& Soc'Y REV. 121 (1996).
11. See Hans Geser, Organisationen als socziale Akteure [Organizations as
Social Actors], 19 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR SOZIOLOGIE 401 (1990) (F.R.G.), available at
http://socio.ch/arbeit/t-hgeser5.htm.
12. JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 548 (1990) (defining
willpower as "the power to prevent short-term interests from overwhelming
long-tern interests"). He observes that the power asymmetry in interactions
between NPs and APs is due in part to the fact that "one actor is a corporate
actor, constructed differently from natural persons. The consequence is that a
corporate actor is in a unique position to exploit weakness of will in natural
persons, even to exploit the potential for such weakness by encouraging
impulsive action." Id. at 549.
13. Chris Guthrie, Better Settle Than Sorry: The Regret Aversion Theory of
Litigation Behavior, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV 43, 82.
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the organizational hierarchy,14  the perpetuation of
unrealistic belief systems, 15 excessive optimism, 16 and a
bias against relinquishing commitments, even in the face of
contrary evidence'17-traits that flourish in the small group
setting of corporate decision-making.' 8
Of course, APs are staffed by NPs. APs have proven
proficient in mobilizing the energies and engaging the
loyalties of NPs, providing a sense of meaning and purpose,
and even inspiring personal sacrifice. NPs often fuse their
personal goals with those of APs, finding them vehicles for
fulfillment of their central personal aspirations. Loyalty to
APs may induce individuals to act contrary to the interests
of NPs such as themselves-and sometimes indeed to their
very selves. 19
APs are not the only kinds of collectivities in which
natural persons participate. APs are outnumbered, even
now, by much more widespread and pervasive "primordial"
institutions-families, religious fellowships, networks of
transactors, neighbors, and friends. Until very recently
these "spontaneous," "communal" institutions were the
predominant forms of social organization. Some APs were
present-governmental bodies, religious institutions, and a
scatter of incorporated utilities, banks, and commercial
enterprises-but most human activity was conducted
14. See Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of
Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (And Cause Other Social
Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 122 (1997).
15. Id. at 133.
16. Id. at 139-40.
17. Id. at 142-43; see also John M. Darley, How Organizations Socialize
Individuals into Evildoing, in CODES OF CONDUCT: BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH INTO
BUSINESS ETHICS 13 (David M. Messick & Ann E. Terbrunsel eds., 1994).
18. See John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick" An
Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 MICH. L.
REV. 386 (1981); Darley, supra note 17, at 13-43 (1996).
19. For example, consider the story of Victor Crawford, a former Tobacco
Institute lobbyist who died of lung cancer (after conversion to anti-tobacco
activism). Jason Vest, No More Smoke Screens: Cancer, Then Remorse, Strikes
an Ex-Tobacco Lobbyist, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 1995, at C1. Or Frank Cornelius,
an insurance lobbyist who led a successful effort to limit recoveries in Indiana
before becoming the victim of catastrophic medical injuries. Andrew Blum, Ex-
Tort Reformer's Son Carries on the Fight, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 17, 1995, at A10.
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through these informal groupings. 20 Over the course of the
last century there has been a dramatic transformation in
the organization of social life from primordial institutions to
"purposively constructed" organizations with specific goals
and formal structures. 21 The family-owned corner grocery
has been replaced by the supermarket, which is now being
challenged by the national big-box retailer; the neighbor-
hood doctor has become part of a Health Maintenance
Organization (HMO); local musicians have been overshad-
owed by the fare provided by entertainment conglomerates.
An increasing portion of our encounters, transactions, and
relationships are with APs.22
The emergence of APs entails a change in our
relationship to the law. If primordial or communal
20. On the regulatory aspects of these, in contemporary society, see Marc
Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering and Indigenous
Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1 (1981); Stewart Macaulay, Private Government, in
LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 445 (Leon Lipson & Stanton Wheeler eds., 1986);
Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-Autonomous Social Field
as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 LAW & SoC'Y 719 (1973).
21. James S. Coleman, The Rational Reconstruction of Society: 1992
Presidential Address, AM. Soc. REV., Feb. 1993, at 1. I do not regard this as
necessarily implying a loss of "community." Arthur Stinchcombe points out that
rather than being mutually inimical, "the solidarity of communal groups is
intimately dependent on their degree of formal organization." Arthur
Stinchcombe, Social Structure and Organizations, in HANDBOOK OF
ORGANIZATIONS (James E. March ed., 1965). Nor should the shift from enclosed
self-contained inclusive communities to looser, overlapping, partial
communities be deplored as a loss of human autonomy or amenity. Cf. SALLY
ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE OR GETTING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS
AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS 172-76 (1990).
22. The population of APs has been increasing more rapidly than the
population of NPs. In 1950, there were 629,314 active corporations in the
United States; in 2001, there were 5,136,000. If we eliminate the 2,986,000 S
corporations, that leaves a total of some 2,150,000 active corporations-more
than three times the total half a century earlier. Of these, some 26,000 had
receipts of more than $50 million in 2001. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES tbls.725, 726 & 955 (2004-2005), http://www.
census.gov/prod/www/statistical-abstract-2001_2005.html. (The NP population
of the United States grew by 86% during the second half of the twentieth
century.) A rough measure of the increasing prominence of APs in innovative
economic activity is provided by figures on patents for invention. In 1980,
corporations were the recipients of 46,000 (76%) of the 66,200 patents issued for
inventions by the U.S. Patent Office. In 2003, corporations received 148,000
(88%) of the 169,000 invention patents. In other words, patents issued to
individuals rose by more than one-third from 1980 to 2003, while patents issued
to corporations more than tripled. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra, at tbl.744.
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institutions are "socially constructed," artificial persons
such as corporations and governments are legally
constructed. In addition to the front line activity of, for
example, manufacturing and selling widgets, the corporate
actor contains devices for governing and modifying this
activity. Like H.L.A. Hart's legal systems, they contain a
combination of primary rules and secondary rules (rules
about the making, changing, and application of rules).23
They contain rules about their internal operations and
about relations with suppliers, customers, and employees.
Not only are these corporate creatures themselves little
legal systems, but they enjoy an affinity with the big, public
legal system. They resemble that system in their reliance
upon bureaucratic organization, written records, and formal
rules.
The increasing presence of APs in our world makes law
more salient. Relations with APs are regulated more by law
than are relationships among NPs and primordial
institutions, in which the admixture of "informal" norms
and reciprocities is higher. Where APs are involved,
regulation is more formal and more likely to rely upon, be
modeled on, or invoke law. Where public law is not
immediately present, it is mirrored in great webs of rules
(for example in the coverage provisions of HMOs) or faux
law (for example in airlines' frequent-flier programs).
As more of our encounters and relationships are with
APs, an increasing portion of our troubles and disputes are
with APs, rather than with other NPs. Conflicts arising
from such relationships increasingly come to the legal
system and are regulated by public law as well as by the
law-like rules generated within APs. (Regulated here
doesn't mean "determined"; law can be present, needing to
be "taken into account," even where it is not "in charge.")
Thus an increasing portion of matters taken up by legal
institutions are conflicts between individuals and
organizations (i.e., between NPs and APs). Great parts of
the civil justice system are populated by claims of APs
against NPs, mostly routine matters of debt collection,
foreclosure, replevin, and so forth. 24 And other sectors of the
23. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961).
24. PUBLIC CITIZEN, FREQUENT FILERS: CORPORATE HYPOCRISY IN ACCESSING
THE COURTS (2004) (cases of types typically filed by businesses against
1376 [Vol. 53
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civil justice system are devoted mainly to individuals
seeking to hold APs to account. A study of civil litigation in
the state courts of general jurisdiction of the seventy-five
most populous counties of the United States found that in
1992, APs were the plaintiffs in some 73% of contracts cases
and only 6% of torts cases, while they defended 60% of
contracts cases and more than half of torts cases. 25 In the
federal courts, Gillian Hadfield estimates that in 1970
organizations were plaintiffs in some 43% of civil cases and
defendants in some 67%. In that year 41% of cases involved
individual plaintiffs suing organizational defendants. By
2000, organizational defendants had increased to 83% but
organization plaintiffs had decreased to 30%, so that 60% of
cases were now individual plaintiffs versus organizational
defendants. 26 There is no comparable data for the state
courts where the vast majority of cases are located, but we
have some indication that the overall configuration of
parties is similar. In 60% of civil jury trials in the seventy-
five counties in 1992 individual plaintiffs were opposed to
organizational defendants.2 7
individuals greatly outnumber case types typically filed by individuals against
businesses).
25. CAROL J. DEFRANCES ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF
STATE COURTS, 1992: CONTRACT CASES IN LARGE COUNTIES tbl.4 (1996); STEVEN
K. SMITH, ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS,
1992: TORT CASES IN LARGE COUNTIES tbl.6 (1995), available at http://www.ojp.
usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/tcilc.pdf. In the tort cases, non-individuals (who I am for
the moment equating with APs) were 49.7% of defendants, but we can safely
assume that insurers were interested parties in a large portion of the other half
of cases in which the nominal defendants were overwhelmingly individuals. Id.
at tbl.6.
26. Gillian Hadfield, Exploring Economic and Democratic Theories of Civil
Litigation: Differences between Individual and Organizational Litigants in the
Disposition of Federal Civil Cases, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1275, 1298, 1304 (2005).
27. CAROL J. DEFRANCES ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY
OF STATE COURTS, 1992: CIVIL JURY CASES AND VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES 3
(1995). These magnitudes are confirmed by Gross and Syverud's study of trials-
to-verdict in California in 1985-86 and 1990-91, where individuals made up
about 94% of plaintiffs in both periods and only 30.6% (1985-86) and 32.6%
(1990-91) of the defendants. Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don't Try:
Civil Jury Verdicts in a System Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 15, 18
(1996).
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II. A SWOLLEN HEMISPHERE
Over the past half-century there has been a dramatic
change in scale in many aspects of the legal. world: the
amount and complexity of legal regulation; the frequency of
litigation; the amount of authoritative legal material; the
number, coordination, and productivity of lawyers; the
number of legal actors and the resources that they devote to
legal activity; the amount of information about law and the
velocity with which it circulates. 28 A crude but useful
summary measure of the scope of legal activity is provided
by looking at spending on law. The receipts of what the
Census Bureau calls the legal services industry (basically,
lawyers in private practice) grew from about four-tenths
(0.4%) of one percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
in 1978 to about one and eight-tenths percent (1.8%) in
2003.29 This understates total spending on legal services for
it does not include in-house legal services consumed by
businesses or governments. In-house corporate lawyers and
government lawyers (including judges) make up about one-
fifth of all practicing lawyers. If we assume that they are as
productive as lawyers in private practice, we can estimate
that the "legal services" portion of GDP is now about two
and a quarter percent-a portion over four times as large as
it was a quarter-century earlier.
Figure 1. Expenditures on Legal Services as Percent of Gross
Domestic Product, 1978-2003
2
1.8
1.6
1.4
U 1.2
o 1
S0.8
UI- 0.6
0.4
0.2
0-
Year
28. See Marc Galanter, Law Abounding: Legalisation Around the North
Atlantic, 55 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1992).
29. See sources cited infra Figure 1.
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Sources: Legal Services data from U.S. Census Bureau, Current
Business Reports: Service Annual Survey, 1983 to Present. The
Census Bureau routinely revises published data in these reports
from one year to the next. Where multiple figures were available,
the most recent one was used. GDP data is in 2000 chained
dollars, available from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of
Economic Analysis, http://www.bea.gov/bealdn/home/gdp.htm (last
visited March 9, 2006).
Given the substantial growth of the underlying
economy, this growth in share represents a very substantial
increase in the absolute size of the legal services industry.
In constant 2000 dollars, the gross receipts of the U.S. law
firms increased 649% from $22.15 billion in 1967 to $166.1
billion in 2002. Legal services expenditures grew much
more rapidly than the economy as a whole. Figure 2
displays the growth of law (measured by legal services
receipts) relative to the whole economy. Using 1967 as our
baseline (n=100), legal services receipts reached 749 in
2002, while the GDP reached 289.
Figure 2. Growth of Gross Domestic Product Compared with
Receipts of Legal Services Industry, 1967-2002, Five Year
Intervals
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100-6
1967 1972 1977 1982 1987 1992 1997 2002
Year
Legal Services I
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Sources: Legal Services Industry from U.S. Census Bureau,
Economic Census: Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services,
1972 to 2002; GDP data is in 2000 chained dollars, available from
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis,
http://www.bea.gov/bea/dn/home/gdp.htm (last visited March 9,
2006).
The provision of legal services to NPs and APs is
performed by different lawyers, who are organized in
different ways. Lawyers in the United States nominally
form a single profession. But it is a profession that is
intensely stratified. With due allowance for exceptions, the
upper strata of the bar consist mostly of large firms whose
members are recruited mainly from elite schools and who
serve organizational clients; the lower strata practice as
individuals or small firms, are drawn from less prestigious
schools, and service individual clients. Law practice is a
bifurcated structure, organized around different kinds of
clients. Much of the variation within the profession, Heinz
and Laumann conclude, is accounted for by
one fundamental distinction-the distinction between lawyers who
represent large organizations (corporations, labor unions, or
government) and those who represent individuals. The two kinds
of law practice are two hemispheres of the profession. Most
lawyers reside exclusively in one hemisphere or the other and
seldom, if ever, cross the equator. 30
In the corporate hemisphere, a wider range of services
is supplied over a longer duration; there is more
specialization and coordination; research and investigation
are more elaborate; tactics can be more innovative and less
routine, etc. 31
During recent decades there has been a dramatic
increase in the presence of lawyers. From 1960 to 2000 the
30. JOHN H. HEINZ & EDWARD 0. LAUMANN, CHICAGO LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 319 (1982).
31. On the contrasting styles of ordinary lawyering and mega-lawyering, see
Marc Galanter, Mega-Law and Mega-Lawyering in the Contemporary United
States," in THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PROFESSIONS: LAWYERS, DOCTORS AND OTHERS
152 (Robert Dingwall & Philip Lewis eds., 1983).
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number of lawyers in the United States more than tripled.3 2
The law firms that service APs have multiplied, grown, and
flourished while the sectors of the profession that serve
individuals have been relatively stagnant in earnings and
growth.33 In 1960 the section of the profession consisting of
large firms devoted to serving corporate clients consisted of
just a few thousand lawyers but by 2000 over one hundred
thousand lawyers worked in such firms. 34
The increasing predominance of organizations as users
of law is dramatically displayed by Heinz and Laumann's
studies of the Chicago bar. They estimated that in 1975
"more than half (53 percent) of the total effort of Chicago's
bar was devoted to the corporate client sector, and a smaller
but still substantial proportion (40 percent) was expended
on the personal client sector. '35 When the researchers
returned to the field twenty years later, they found that
there were roughly twice as many lawyers working in
Chicago. But in 1995, about 64% of the total effort of all
Chicago lawyers was devoted to the corporate client sector
and only 29% to the personal/small business sector. 36 Since
the number of lawyers in Chicago had doubled, this meant
that the total effort devoted to the personal sector had
increased by 45%. But the corporate sector grew by 126%.
To the extent that lawyers serving the corporate sector
were able to combine more staff and support services with
their effort, these figures understate the gap in services
delivered.
32. The lawyer population increased 235% from 285,933 in 1960 to
1,066,328 in 2000. There was one lawyer for every 627 people in 1960 and one
for every 264 people in 2000. CLARA N. CARSON, THE LAWYER STATISTICAL
REPORT: THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN 2000 1 (2004).
33. See Richard H. Sander & E. Douglass Williams, Why Are There So Many
Lawyers? Perspectives on a Thrbulent Market, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 431
(1989).
34. In 1957 there were just thirty-eight law firms in the United States with
more than fifty lawyers. ERWIN 0. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER:
PROFESSIONAL ORGANIZATION MAN? 43 (1969). In 2000 over 122,000 lawyers
(some 36% of firm lawyers and 18% of all lawyers in private practice) worked in
the 737 firms with fifty-one or more lawyers. CARSON, supra note 32, at 9, 15.
35. HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 30, at 42.
36. John P. Heinz et al., The Changing Character of Lawyers' Work: Chicago
in 1975 and 1995, 32 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 751, 765 tbl.3 (1998).
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Is this pattern peculiar to Chicago? Or to the largest
metropolitan areas? The generality of both the contours of
distribution and the patterns of change are suggested by
census data. As the size of the legal services "pie" was
increasing, businesses were buying a greater share of that
pie. In 1967, individuals bought 55% of the product of the
legal services industry and businesses bought 39%. In 2002,
individual purchases had fallen to 41.4% and business
purchases has risen to 47.4% of a much-enlarged total.37
Table 1 summarizes these changes. Figures 2 and 3 depict
the change in the portion of purchases of legal services by
different categories of buyers.
37. From 1967 to 1992, with each subsequent five-year period, the business
portion has increased and the share consumed by individuals declined. The
apparent sharp reversal in 1997 (visible in Figure 3) is due to reporting error
(as explained in the note to Figure 3, infra).
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Table 1. Receipts of Legal Services Industry by Class of
Client, 1967-2002 (Billions of Dollars)
Total TotalSuppl R ts Individuals Business Government OtherSuppliers Receipts
1967
2000 Dollars $22.15 $12.20 $8.64 $1.31
Actual Dollars $5.23 $2.88 $2.04 $0.31
% of Receipts 100% 55% 39% 6%
1972 77,282
2000 Dollars $32.47 $17.06 $13.73 $0.94 $0.74
Actual Dollars $9.67 $5.08 $4.09 $0.28 $0.22
% of Receipts 100% 53% 42% 2.90% 2.30%
% Change from 1967 46.59% 39.85% 58.96% -28.39%
1977 94,882
2000 Dollars $41.03 $19.38 $18.23 $1.34 $0.98
Actual Dollars $17.15 $8.10 $7.62 $0.56 $0.41
% of Receipts 100% 49% 46% 3.30% 2.50%
% Change from 1972 26.37% 13.61% 32.75% 42.51% 32.79%
1982 115,407
2000 Dollars $55.76 $24.81 $27.11 $1.79 $2.03
Actual Dollars $34.32 $15.27 $16.69 $1.10 $1.25
% of Receipts 100% 45% 50% 3.30% 3.70%
% Change from 1977 35.88% 28.00% 48.72% 33.38% 107.01%
1987 138,222
2000 Dollars $92.42 $38.78 $47.07 $3.19 $3.39
Actual Dollars $66.99 $28.11 $34.12 $2.31 $2.46
% of Receipts 100% 42% 51% 3.40% 3.70%
% Change from 1982 65.75% 56.32% 73.60% 78.33% 67.12%
1992 142,606
2000 Dollars $115.65 $46.70 $60.04 $4.46 $4.44
Actual Dollars $99.14 $40.03 $51.47 $3.82 $3.81
% of Receipts 100% 40% 51% 3.80% 3.80%
% Change from 1987 25.14% 20.42% 27.56% 39.84% 30.97%
1997 165,757
2000 Dollars $129.00 $63.43 $54.47 $3.96 $1.73
Actual Dollars $122.62 $60.29 $51.78 $3.76 $1.64
% of Receipts 100% 49.62% 42.20% 3.10% 1.30%
% Change from 1992 23.68% 50.61% 0.60% -1.57% -56.96%
2002 179,346
2000 Dollars $166.10 $68.73 $79.61 $6.28 $4.15
Actual Dollars $171.83 $71.10 $82.36 $6.50 $4.29
% of Receipts 100.00% 41.40% 47.90% 3.80% 2.50%
% Change from 1997 40.13% 17.93% 59.06% 72.87% 161.59%
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Sources: Legal Services Industry from U.S. Census Bureau,
Economic Census: Professional, Scientific, and Technical Services,
1972 through 2002; Price deflator for 2000 dollar values from
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/data/GDPDEF.txt (last visited
March 9, 2006). For 1967 only total receipts overall are available
from the U.S. Census. Percentages for classes of clients are taken
from Richard H. Sander & E. Douglas Williams, Why are There So
Many Lawyers? Perspectives on a Turbulent Market, 14 LAW &
SOC. INQUIRY 431, 441 (1989). In their analyses, government and
other are combined categories, thus the 6% figure includes both
categories. Calculations of percentage change of these categories
from 1967 to 1972 combines government and other.
Table 1 indicates that individuals' expenditures on legal
services (in constant dollars) increased 463% from 1967 to
1992, while law firms' receipts from businesses increased by
821% during that period. Even this higher rate of growth
understates the growth of business expenditures on legal
services, for it includes only outside lawyers and does not
include in-house legal expenditures, which greatly
increased during this period.38 Figures 3 and 4 display the
relative growth in legal services receipts from the various
kinds of clients.
Figure 3. Receipts of Legal Service Industry by Class of Client,
1967-2002
$180-
$160- /
$140-
$120o
0,-, $o
$20 2002
1997
$40- 1992
1987
$20 - 1982
1977
$0 1972$0 1967
Total frndiv Bus Gov Other
38. For exclusion of in-house legal services from Census of Service
Industries, see the introduction to the U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, 1982 CENSUS OF SERVICE INDUSTRIES, iii-vi (1984).
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Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Economic Census, 1972 through
2002.
Note: The component figures for 1997 are plainly anomalous: the
clear trend of receipts from business growing faster than receipts
from individuals over the entire period suddenly reverses in 1997
and reverts in 2002. This is the result of reporting error. According
to Holly C. Higgins, Survey Statistician, U.S. Bureau of the
Census, a number of firms that year entered all of their receipts on
the line, "All other fees received," which appears on the form as a
sub-category of Individuals. For the firms so reporting, receipts
that came from Business, Government, or Other sources were
counted as receipts from Individuals, which explains why the
figure for Individuals grew much faster than the figure for
Business in 1997. E-mail from Holly C. Higgins, Survey
Statistician, U.S. Bureau of the Census, to William B. Turner,
(Aug. 11, 2005) (on file with author).
We may think that the presence of dedicated "public
interest lawyers" or "cause lawyers" and the "pro bono"
exertions of corporate firms help to offset this imbalance.
Pro bono volunteers "do a tremendous service representing
individual poor clients in routine matters and lending their
institutional resources to support the reform agendas of
public interest groups. ' 39 But pro bono work is ultimately
constrained by the interests of the provider firms, who are
vigorous advocates for corporate clients. Public interest law
firms may be free of such constraint, but it should be noted
that the public interest law format has been successfully
borrowed by groups aligned with corporate parties, so that
there now is at least as much "public interest" lawyering on
behalf of corporations and their allies as there is on behalf
of their antagonists. 40
As law, driven by corporate expenditures, becomes more
technical, complex, and expensive, individuals are just the
39. Scott L. Cummings, The Politics of Pro Bono, 52 UCLA L. REV. 1, 147
(2004). Estimating the scale of pro bono activity, Deborah Rhode concludes that
"the best available research finds that American lawyers average less than half
an hour of work per week and under half a dollar per day in support of pro bono
legal services." Deborah L. Rhode, Pro Bono in Principle and in Practice, 26
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL'Y 315, 328 (2005).
40. BRIAN TAMANAHA, THE STRUGGLE FOR LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END ch. 8
(forthcoming 2006).
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wrong size to use legal services effectively. 41 It is a rare
instance in which the kinds of options that are routine for
large organizations are feasible and effective for
individuals. "[T]he market for lawyers," Gillian Hadfield
observes, "overwhelmingly allocates legal resources to
clients with interests backed by corporate aggregations of
wealth. '42 The aspects of the legal system most responsive
to the needs and aspirations of individuals absorb less of its
energy and attention as "the legal system prices itself out of
the reach of all individuals except those with a claim on
corporate wealth."43 So the system is "heavily, and it seems
increasingly, skewed towards managing the economy rather
than safeguarding just relationships and democratic
institutions."44 As the courts focus more on economic issues,
the message is that this is what adjudication should be
about. Tort reform campaigns attack the propriety of "non-
41. For example, the legal aid attorney who prevailed in the landmark
unconscionability case of Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d
445 (D.C. Cir. 1965), reported that the case required 210 hours of legal work.
Robert H. Skilton & Orrin L. Helstad, Protection of the Installment Buyer of
Goods under the Uniform Commercial Code, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1465, 1480 n.38
(1967). At a modest (for the 1960s) hourly fee of $25, protection of Mrs.
William's $1800 worth of purchases would have cost her $5250 in lawyers' fees
alone. An even more daunting example is provided by the experience of A.
Ernest Fitzgerald, the Air Force cost analyst who disclosed the multibillion
dollar cost overrun in the C-5A transport. In the course of winning his six-year
fight for reinstatement (with back pay) in his $31,000 per year job, he
accumulated lawyers fees of more than $400,000:
[A] small army of Government lawyers was set to work against Mr.
Fitzgerald-lawyers representing the Air Force, the Department of
Defense, the Justice Department, the United States Attorney's Office
and the Civil Service Commission.
These lawyers delayed hearings, refusing to turn over documents,
appealed every concession made, filed motions that required scores of
time-consuming proceedings taking up time-and all the while Mr.
Fitzgerald's attorneys were costing him $125 an hour.
Broad Effects Seen From Award of Legal Fees to Pentagon Aide, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 2, 1976, at 8. A more recent example is provided by the inability of
well-resourced individuals like the Clintons to finance their legal fees. See
Stuart Taylor, "Brother, Can You Spare Some Fees?", LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 18,
1996, at 23.
42. Gillian Hadfield, The Price of Law: How the Market for Lawyers Distorts
the Justice System, 98 MICH. L. REV. 953, 998 (2000).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1004.
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economic" damages with the implication that "non-
economic" items like pain, suffering, and disfigurement are
unmeasurable, unsubstantial, and illusory.
III. THE WINNING WAYS OF APs
Not only do APs occupy more of the legal realm, they
are more resourceful and more successful users of law than
NPs. Unsurprisingly, in those arenas like lobbying45 or
administrative hearings 46 where actors can deploy the full
range of their assets, recurrent organizational players fare
better than individuals. Such advantages appear also in the
judicial forum, in which parties are ostensibly on an equal
footing. Some years ago, I attempted to identify some of the
advantages enjoyed by recurrent (usually organizational)
players ("repeat-players") over infrequent individual
players ("one-shotters"). 47 Briefly, my catalog included:
" ability to utilize advance intelligence, structure the
next transaction, build a record and so forth.
" ability to develop expertise; ready access to
specialists; economies of scale and low start-up costs
for any case.
45. See Lester M. Salamon & John J. Siegfried, Economic Power and
Political Influence: The Impact of Industry Structure on Public Policy, 71 AM.
POL. SCI. REV. 1026 (1977).
46. See Erasmus H. Kloman, Public Participation in Technology Assessment,
35 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 67 (1975).
47. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the
Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 95, 97 (1974). A number of scholars
have identified further advantages of the corporate player in the legal arena,
including the ability to impede less formidable opponents from using the legal
process by bringing "SLAPP suits" ("Strategic Litigation Against Public
Participation"). See, e.g., GEORGE W. PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS:
GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING OUT (1996); FIONA J. L. DONSON, LEGAL
INTIMIDATION: A SLAPP IN THE FACE OF DEMOCRACY (2000). Alternatively,
repeat-players (who are almost always APs) may raise the barrier to challenges
by manipulating the conflict of interest rules to prevent opponents from
obtaining high-quality specialized representation. SUSAN P. SHAPIRO, TANGLED
LOYALTIES: CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN LEGAL PRACTICE 182-84 (2002). Again, sheer
scale may enable an AP to play for rules simultaneously and strategically in a
number of different subject areas, carrying favorable rules "established in one
substantive law area . . . to others." Lea VanderVelde, Wal-Mart as a
Phenomenon in the Legal World: Matters of Scale, Scale Matters, in WAL-MART
WORLD (Stanley Braun ed., forthcoming 2006).
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" opportunity to develop facilitative informal relations
with institutional incumbents.
" ability to establish and maintain credibility as a
combatant. With no bargaining reputation to main-
tain, the one-time litigant has greater difficulty in
convincing establishing commitments to his bargain-
ing positions. 4s
" ability to play the odds. The larger the matter at issue
looms for the one-shotter, the more likely he is to
avoid risk (that is, minimize the probability of
maximum loss). The greater size of these recurrent
organizational litigants means that the stakes are
both absolutely larger (and thus justify greater
expenditures) and relatively smaller, so they can
adopt strategies calculated to maximize gain over a
long series of cases, even where this involves the risk
of maximum loss in some cases. (This advantage is an
application of a much more general capacity of
corporate actors to utilize actuarial practices that
"allow power to be exercised more effectively and at
lower political cost.") 49
" ability to play for rules as well as immediate gains. It
is worthwhile for a recurrent litigant to expend
resources in influencing the making of relevant rules
by lobbying and so forth. 50 Recurrent litigants can
48. H. LAWRENCE Ross, SETTLED OUT OF COURT: THE SOCIAL PROCESS OF
INSURANCE CLAIMS ADJUSTMENT 156 (1970); THOMAS C. SHELLING, THE STRATEGY
OF CONFLICT 22, 41 (1963).
49. Jonathan Simon, The Ideological Effects of Actuarial Practices, 21 LAw &
SoC'Y REV. 771 (1988).
50. Lobbying may be subtle and may be directed to judges as well as
legislators and administrators. On the organized provision of "educational"
junkets for judges by corporate partisans, see DOUGLAS T. KENDALL & JASON C.
RYLANDER, COMMUNITY RIGHTS COUNSEL, TAINTED JUSTICE: How PRIVATE
JUDICIAL TRIPS UNDERMINE PUBLIC TRUST IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2004);
ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, JUSTICE FOR SALE: SHORTCHANGING THE PUBLIC INTEREST
FOR PRIVATE GAIN (1993). Gary Edmond and David Mercer describe the role of
corporate-sponsored think-tanks and polemicists in promoting the convergence
of judicial attitudes about expert evidence and civil liability with "legal weapons
[that] were crafted and refined in corporate foundries." Gary Edmond & David
Mercer, Daubert and the Exclusionary Ethos: The Convergence of Corporate and
Judicial Attitudes towards the Admissibility of Expert Evidence in Tort
Litigation, 26 LAW & POL'Y 231, 251 (2004). The latest variation of "lobbying"
the judiciary is "seeding" the research of independent scholars in the hope of
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also play for rules in litigation itself whereas a one-
time litigant is unlikely to do so.
In the years since these speculations were first
published, many researchers have attempted to test the
presence and magnitude of such advantages. 51 In the
current American setting, the well-resourced repeat-player
(RP) is in almost all cases an organization, so that
researchers have variously operationalized RPs as
organizations, businesses, etc. A body of evidence has
accumulated showing that organizations do better than
individuals in almost every kind of litigation, at almost
every stage, and as both plaintiffs and defendants.
Two recent studies of federal court litigation suggest
that organizational litigants win more frequently and lose
less often than do individuals. Terence Dunworth and Joel
Rogers compared the litigation of the largest corporations
with that of all other parties in the federal courts for a
twenty-year period. The largest corporations were more
successful both as plaintiffs and as defendants: they won
79% of the federal cases in which they were plaintiffs,
compared to 62% won by all other parties.52 As defendants,
the gap was even greater: the largest corporations won
producing literature that would be useful ammunition for advocacy. Thus the
Exxon Corporation promoted and supported extensive research on punitive
damages by prominent scholars. See Alan Zarembo, Funding Studies to Suit
Need: In the 1990s, Exxon Began Paying for Research into Juries and the
Damages they Award. The Findings Have Served the Firm Well in Court, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 3, 2003, at A-i; see also William R. Freudenburg, Seeding Science,
Courting Conclusions: Reexamining the Intersection of Science, Corporate Cash,
and the Law, 20 Soc. F. 3 (2005). The findings of this research have been
deployed in advocacy aimed at curtailing punitive damages, such as those
facing the corporate sponsor in the Exxon Valdez oil spill case. See Brief of
Certain Leading Business Corporations as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Curtis B. Campbell &
Inez Preece Campbell, 537 U.S. 1042 (2002) (No. 01-1289).
51. See, e.g., Symposium, Do the "Haves" Still Come Out Ahead?, 33 LAW &
Soc'Y REV. 793 (1999); IN LITIGATION: Do THE "HAVES" STILL COME OUT AHEAD?
(Herbert M. Kritzer & Susan S. Silbey eds., 2003). Research along these lines is
surveyed in Brian J. Glenn, The Varied and Abundant Progeny, in IN
LITIGATION, supra, at 371.
52. Terence Dunworth & Joel Rogers, Corporations in Court: Big Business
Litigation in U.S. Federal Courts, 1971-1991, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 497, 557
(1996).
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some 62% of the time while other parties won only 33% of
their cases.53
In a comparison of performance confined to diversity
cases, Dunworth and Rogers were able to separate business
from non-business parties. As Table 2 shows, businesses
outperformed non-business parties as both plaintiffs and
defendants. The largest businesses actually won a smaller
percentage of their plaintiff cases than did other businesses,
but maintained their winning ways as defendants. Other
businesses outperformed non-business parties by a wide
margin as plaintiffs and a more modest one as defendants.
Table 2. Percentage of Cases Won by Various Kinds of Parties in
Federal District Courts, 1971-1991
As As
Plaintiffs Defendants
All Cases Fortune 2000 79% 62%
Other Parties 62% 33%
Diversity Fortune 2000 71% 61%
Cases Other Business 80% 36%
Parties
Non-Business 64% 28%
Parties
Source: Dunworth & Rogers, supra note 52, at 557-58.
In another study of federal diversity cases, Theodore
Eisenberg and Henry Farber eliminated personal injury
cases (because corporations are so infrequently plaintiffs)
and compared the performance of corporations and
individuals as plaintiffs. 54 Again, corporations won some
83% and individuals some 60% of the cases in which they
were plaintiffs. Eisenberg and Farber divide their cases
according to the configuration of the parties and present the
plaintiff-win rates for the various match-ups between
individuals and organizations. These are shown in Table 3.
53. Id.
54. Theodore Eisenberg & Henry S. Farber, The Litigious Plaintiff
Hypothesis: Case Selection and Resolution, 28 RAND J. ECON. S92, S99 (1997).
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Table 3. Plaintiff Win Rates by Configuration of Parties, Federal
District Courts, Non-Personal Injury Diversity Cases, 1986-1994
Defendant
Overall Plaintiff Win Rate
(Win Rate at Trial) Individual Corporation TOTAL
[Trial Rate]
72.4% 50.1% 60.8%
- Individual (63.3.%) (56.0%) (58.6%)
[3.61%] [4.49%] [4.12%]
90.8% 74.8% 83.6%
Corporation (66.2%) (64.0%) (64.8%)
[2.52%] [3.41%] [3.04%]
83.4% 63.2% 73.7%
TOTAL (64.5%) (59.3%) (61.2%)
[3.07%] [3.95%] [3.58%]
Source: Eisenberg & Farber, supra note 54, at S103 tbl.2.
We see that not only do corporate plaintiffs win more,
they win even more frequently as both plaintiffs and
defendants when opposing individuals than when opposing
other corporations. They won 90% of the cases in which
they sued individuals and lost only 50% of the cases in
which individuals sued them. The differentials are less for
that small subset (3.58%) of cases that went to trial.
(Interestingly, the individual plaintiff vs. corporate
defendant match-up was the only configuration in which
plaintiffs won more frequently at trial than at the pre-trial
stages.)
These patterns are not peculiar to federal district
courts. Studying three urban trial courts, Craig Wanner
found that business and government plaintiffs win more
often and more quickly than do individual plaintiffs. 55 Not
only are they more successful overall, which might be
attributed to differences in the kinds of cases they bring,
but they are more successful in almost every one of the
heavily litigated categories of cases. Organizations did
55. Craig Wanner, The Public Ordering of Private Relations: Part II:
Winning Civil Court Cases, 9 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 293, 305 tbl.9 (1975).
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strikingly better not only as plaintiffs, but also as
defendants. 56 This general pattern is confirmed by Harold
Owen's study of two Georgia trial courts: individual
plaintiffs win less often and individual defendants lose
more often than their organizational counterparts. 57
Corporations not only get better results, but they do so
at lower cost-i.e., with pre-tax dollars. As Jeffrey Stempel
observes,
commercial litigants have a natural economic advantage in
litigation with natural persons. The litigation expenditures
(indeed, all dispute resolution expenditures) of the commercial
litigant are almost certain to be successfully characterized as
business expenses deductible in the year in which they are
incurred. Thus, the money spent on litigation . . . effectively
reduces the litigant company's taxes by as much as one-third. By
contrast, an individual claiming tortious injury, breach of
consumer contract, discrimination, or fraud is normally unable to
have his or her disputing costs partially subsidized by the
government. 58
It is widely believed that juries are resolutely hostile to
corporations. Actually juries find more frequently in favor
of corporations, but where they do find corporations liable,
they award higher damages than against other parties for
comparable injuries. 59 Experimental studies suggest that
this is not so much a "deep pocket" effect as an effect of
jurors' estimation of corporations as being equipped with
greater capacity to foresee and prevent harm.6 0
56. Id. at 302 tbl.7.
57. Harold J. Owen, Jr., The Role of Trial Courts in The Local Political
System: A Comparison of Two Georgia Counties (1971) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Georgia) (on file with author).
58. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Contracting Access to the Courts: Myth of Reality?
Boon or Bane? 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 965, 998 (1998).
59. For example, "[b]usinesses were somewhat more successful with juries
than were individuals, both as plaintiffs and defendants." AUDREY CHIN & MARK
A. PETERSON, DEEP POCKETS, EMPTY POCKETS: WHO WINS IN COOK COUNTY JURY
TRIALS? 25 (1985). But awards against corporate defendants were considerably
higher than against individuals. Id. at 27.
60. See Valerie P. Hans, The Contested Role of the Civil Jury in Business
Litigation, 79 JUDICATURE 242 (1996); Robert J. MacCoun, Differential
Treatment of Corporate Defendants by Juries: An Examination of the 'Deep
Pockets" Hypothesis, 30 LAw & SOC'Y REV. 121 (1996).
1392 [Vol. 53
PLANET OF THE APs
The advantages of organized and powerful players in
the judicial arena are not peculiar to federal courts, or to
trial courts, nor to the present era. Analyzing outcomes in
state supreme courts over the period 1870-1970, Wheeler et
al. found
that parties with greater resources-relatively speaking, the
"haves"-generally fared better than those with fewer resources.
In match-ups between stronger and weaker parties, the stronger
consistently and on a variety of different measures won an
advantage averaging 5 percent. 6 1
They also concluded that
the more sharply party disparity can be delineated, the larger the
net advantage of the stronger parties, and some of those
advantages are really substantial. Thus the consistent advantage
to the 'haves' in our results probably understates their true
advantage. 62
In a study of the success of appellants before U.S.
Courts of Appeals (4th, 7th, and 11th circuits in 1986),
Donald Songer and Reginald Sheehan found that "[t]he
success rates of appellants consistently increase with each
incremental increase in their strength relative to the
strength of the respondent."63 They discovered that "the
relative advantages of the 'haves' were generally found to
be several times as great in the courts of appeals as they
were in [Wheeler et al.'s] state supreme courts."64
Kevin Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg looked at the
propensity of federal appellate courts in thirteen categories
of non-personal injury diversity trials and found that
plaintiffs and defendants fare very differently in the
61. Stanton Wheeler et al., Do the "Haves" Come Out Ahead? Winning and
Losing in State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970, 21 LAw & Soc'y REV. 403, 443
(1987).
62. Id.
63. Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Who Wins on Appeal?
Upperdogs and Underdogs in the United States Courts of Appeals, 36 AM. J. POL.
Sci. 235, 246 (1992).
64. Id. at 255. Such consistent advantages for "haves" parties were not found
in the U.S. Supreme Court when the effects of ideology were controlled. See id.
at 235-58.
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appeals process. 6 5 Where a plaintiff wins in the trial courts,
defendant appellants secure reversals almost twice as
frequently as do plaintiff appellants in cases where
defendants win at trial (28.4% vs. 14.8%).66 Corporate losers
at the trial court level appeal more frequently than
individual losers (28.5% vs. 20.2% as plaintiffs, 22.4% vs.
17.1% as defendants) and more of these appeals lead to
reversals (21.5% for corporate plaintiffs vs. 12.5% for
individual plaintiffs, 27.5% for corporate defendants vs.
24% for individual defendants). 67 Reversals of jury verdicts
at the instance of defendants are almost twice as frequent
as reversals at the instance of plaintiffs. Clermont and
Eisenberg conclude that the most plausible explanation is
appellate judges' mistaken attribution of pro-plaintiff bias
on the part of juries. 68 We have seen that increasingly the
plaintiffs in federal civil cases are NPs and the defendants
are APs. So the "plaintiphobia" of the appellate courts, as
Clermont and Eisenberg call it, becomes another layer of
advantage for APs.
Do these disparities in success in the judicial forum
necessarily reflect the differences in "party capability" or
"the relational effects of asymmetric parties"? 69  The
universe of disputes and litigation is frequently and
usefully visualized as a pyramid made up of successive
layers including perceived injuries, grievances, claims,
65. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the
Appellate Courts: Civil Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments,
2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 947 (2002).
66. Id. at 131 tbl.1.
67. Id. at 138 nn.22-23.
68. Id. at 138.
69. Such effects are not confined to courts in the United States. Studies of
the Supreme Court and the Provincial Courts of Appeal in Canada found clear
confirmation of the party capability thesis. Peter McCormick, Party Capability
Theory and Appellate Success in the Supreme Court of Canada, 1949-1992, 26
CAN. J. POL. SCI. 523 (1993); Peter McCormick, Who Wins and Who Loses in the
Provincial Courts of Appeal? A Statistical Analysis, 1920-1990, CAN. J.L. &
SoC'Y, Fall 1994, at 21. Outcomes in the English Court of Appeal reflect "the
relational effects of asymmetric parties." Burton M. Atkins, A Cross National
Perspective on the Structuring of Trial Court Outputs: The Case of the English
High Court, in COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL SYSTEMS 143 (John R. Schmidhauser ed.,
1987); see also Burton M. Atkins, Party Capability Theory as an Explanation for
Intervention Behavior in the English Court of Appeal, 35 AM. J. POL. Sci. 881
(1991).
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disputes, filings, trials, and appeals. 70 There is attrition-
often very pronounced-as cases move up the pyramid; only
a fraction of the possible cases run the whole course to
trials and appeals. As matters proceed up the pyramid,
there is selection. 71 The cases that survive to the next layer
are not entirely representative of the cohort at a given level.
For example, such survivors may involve larger injuries or
involve parties that are more knowledgeable, more
contentious, less risk-averse or better supplied with
resources.
Some portion of the observed difference in gross rates of
success is attributable to the make-up of the litigation
portfolios of organizations and individuals. Organizations
bring more cases of the kinds that are easiest to win (such
70. A brief summation of the "pyramid" analysis may be found at Marc
Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know
(and Think We Know) about Our Allegedly Contenious and Litigious Society, 31
UCLA L. REV. 4, 12-32 (1983). See also Marc Galanter, Adjudication, Litigation
and Related Phenomena, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 151, 183-203 (Leon
Lipson & Stanton Wheeler eds., 1986). See generally William L.F. Felstiner et
al., The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming,
Claiming ... , 15 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 631 (1980-81) (providing a conceptual
framework for studying the emergence and transformation of disputes); Neil
Vidmar, Justice Motives and Other Psychological Factors in the Development
and Resolution of Disputes, in THE JUSTICE MOTIVE IN SOCIAL BEHAVIOR:
ADAPTING TO TIMES OF SCARCITY AND CHANGE 395, 409-13 (Melvin J. Lerner &
Sally C. Lerner eds., 1981). The first major empirical application of this method
was undertaken by Richard E. Miller & Austin Sarat, Grievances, Claims and
Disputes: Assessing the Adversary Culture, 15 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 525 (1980-81)
(reporting on a survey of households estimating the rates of grievances, claims,
and disputes that could have been brought to a civil court of general
jurisdiction). See also Herbert M. Kritzer, Propensity to Sue in England and the
United States of America: Blaming and Claiming in Tort Cases, 18 J.L. & SOC'Y
400 (1991); Herbert M. Kritzer et al., The Aftermath of Injury: Cultural Factors
in Compensation Seeking in Canada and the United States, 25 LAw & SOC'Y
REV. 499, 501-02 (1991); Herbert M. Kritzer et al., To Confront or Not to
Confront: Measuring Claiming Rates in Discrimination Grievances, 25 LAW &
SOCY REV. 875, 879-82 (1991).
71. See, e.g., George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes
for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984); see also Donald Wittman, Is the
Selection of Cases for Trial Biased?, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 185 (1985) (proposing a
model for the distribution of litigant estimates of outcomes that differs from
Priest and Klein's model and leads to contrary conclusions about the litigation
process); Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of
Settlement Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV.
319 (1991) (explaining why a good part of the Priest and Klein framework is at
odds with the data and presenting data on failed pretrial negotiations).
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as collections, foreclosures, etc.) and organizations bring not
only different cases but "better" cases. As plaintiffs, they
can avoid weak cases by forbearance to bring suit or by
readily accepting a low settlement; as defendants, they can
settle the more meritorious and attractive cases against
them-perhaps before filing. So their portfolio tends to
consist of cases in which the evidence is stronger and the
claim more firmly located within accepted lines of recovery.
Stronger evidence, more cut-and-dried claims, and
unassailable defenses are the result of advance planning
and good record-keeping, as well as of the intrinsic merit of
the claim. A calculating settlement policy reflects their
capacity as litigants as much as the virtues of their conduct
in the underlying transaction. Their capacity is enhanced
by lawyering that involves more preventive work,
continuity of attention, specialized expertise, economies of
scale, and shrewd investment in rule development in
judicial, legislative, and administrative settings. This is not
a new phenomenon. Describing federal diversity litigation
in the late nineteenth century, Edward Purcell observes
that
[c]orporations had the time, resources, incentives and
sophistication both to litigate selectively in order to maximize
their chances of developing favorable common law rules and to
lobby the legislatures persistently in an effort to have statutory
law tailored most closely to their interests. 72
Difference in the "merits" of cases, then, is in large measure
not an alternative explanation of party success, but a
specification of one of the ways in which party capability
affects the profile of litigation.
Which is not to say that "merit" is illusory or that the
courts are biased against individuals. Courts are like the
referees in a basketball game between an NP team of six-
foot tall players and an AP team of equally-talented seven-
footers. The seven-foot AP team doesn't get its baskets
dishonestly, and sometimes the six-footers win the game,
but over the long haul the disparity in resources is reflected
in the scores. In sports like basketball and football, we
tolerate gross disparities of physical stature (relying on
72. EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY
JURISDICTION IN INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870-1958, at 29 (1992).
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schedulers to preserve the element of genuine contest?),
while in other sports, such as boxing, this is considered
unfair and the contest is conducted in weight classes (or in
gender divisions, as in golf, tennis, swimming, and track).
Adjudication resembles professional team sports in this
respect: no allowance is made for the difference in height or
reach. In basketball and football, the game is dominated by
ever-taller and ever-heavier players; fewer short and light
players can compete. In baseball, the richest teams collect
the best players and win more frequently. 73 Similarly, in
the legal arena, organizational players are crowding out
individual ones and they are more frequently successful.
When I say corporations and other APs are on the
whole more capable players of the law game, I am not
attributing to them a preternatural competence and
freedom from error. Corporations blunder just as do
individuals and the blundering reflects the structure of
corporations: their problems of coordination, the necessity
of acting through agents with their own limited
perspectives and separate ambitions. But their performance
suggests that on the whole the corporate entity's
incremental increase in capability as a legal actor
outweighs these distractions. In short, our institutions of
legal remedy are not exempt from the working of the
general phenomenon of cumulative advantage. 74
73. "Of the 13 major league clubs with the highest payrolls during the 1998
season, only Baltimore finished below .500. Of the 17 others, only St. Louis and
Toronto were above .500." Jeff Miller, Too many franchises asking: Why bother?,
WIS. ST. J., Apr. 4, 1999, at 1D. From 1996 to 1999, teams in the fourth payroll
quartile won a median of seventy-two games (in a 162 game season), a number
which progressed steadily by quartiles to a median of 95 for teams in the first
payroll quartile. Paul L. Caron & Rafael Gely, What Law Schools Can Learn
from Billy Beane and the Oakland Athletics, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1483, 1489 (2004)
(reviewing MICHAEL LEWIS, MONEYBALL: THE ART OF WINNING AN UNFAIR GAME
(2003)).
74. The cumulative advantage phenomenon has been observed in many
settings. Merton and Zuckerman identified what they called the "Matthew
effect": "[T]he process by which those who have been given some advantages
come to be given still more." WILLIAM J. GOODE, THE CELEBRATION OF HEROES:
PRESTIGE AS A SOCIAL CONTROL SYSTEM 279 (1978). In the sociology of science,
such cumulative advantage is understood to be present, but there is still
uncertainty about the precise mechanism. See Paul D. Allison, J. Scott Long &
Tad K. Krauze, Cumulative Advantage and Inequality in Science, 47 AM. Soc.
REV. 615 (1982). A humbler example is Barry Schwartz's study of behavior in
waiting rooms, which finds that the various sorts of accommodative deference
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Party capacity to litigate not only affects the outcome of
individual cases, but shapes the judicial agenda. Organized
parties can undertake sustained campaigns of litigation.
The classic example is the NAACP's campaign against
school segregation.7 5  A more recent example is the
continuing corporate campaign to curtain punitive damage
awards. 76 The scale of these "party effects" is displayed in
Charles Epp's comparative study of the rights agenda of
courts of last resort in the U.S., Canada, England, and
India.77 He found that an enlarged rights agenda was best
explained not by "top-down" theories of judicial ideology but
by a "bottom-up" theory focused on the organizational and
financial resources of the groups advocating such cases. So
organizations fare better in court not only in terms of
results, but in terms of setting the courts' agenda.
IV. THE CORPORATIZATION OF THE LAW
At the same time that APs are becoming more
dominant in the legal world they are themselves changing.
Although it is difficult to generalize about such a large and
diverse population, it appears that overall APs are moving
away from their origins as instruments devoted to
supplying specific goods or services to NPs and are
increasingly guided by concerns with their own power,
longevity, and reputation. According to an eminent
organization-watcher, "virtually every development
associated with industrialization and the establishment of
(waiting time, escorting, proffering drinks) accorded to higher status clients
tend to feed into and subserve one another, so that in the aggregate they
unintentionally violate the norm of distributive justice they sought to conform
to. "While each server grants a client his proper due, the resulting distribution
(effected by two servers) allows some clients somewhat more than their due."
BARRY SCHWARTZ, QUEUING AND WAITING: STUDIES IN THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION
OF ACCESS AND DELAY 152 (1975). Schwartz finds this same kind of
"multiplication of social profits implicit in the strain toward status congruence"
in the distribution of unproductive and costly waiting time in courts, where
"some persons and groups are relatively exempt from waiting. . . . [In] the
courtroom.., the powerful are most likely to enjoy such advantage." Id. at 29.
75. MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP'S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED
EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987).
76. See, e.g., STEPHEN DANIELS & JOANNE MARTIN, CIVIL JURIES AND THE
POLITICS OF REFORM (1995).
77. CHARLES EPP, THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: LAWYERS, ACTIVISTS AND
SUPREME COURTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1998).
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the corporate form of organization ... [has] caused mission
to be displaced as an organizational goal in favor of the
systems goals, notably profit and especially growth . *..."78
The famous example of the March of Dimes re-inventing
itself after the conquest of polio is a convenient symbol of
this tendency within corporate organizations. Now corpora-
tions change their names to efface any connection with
particular functions.
And the relations among the various sorts of APs are
changing as well. In the past thirty years the business
corporation has achieved an ascendancy over government
entities and non-profit associations. Business corporations
have for a long time enjoyed a privileged position in
American government, enjoying subsidies, solicitude, and
deference. 79 Since the 1970s, this has been accentuated by a
precipitous decline in confidence in governmental
institutions8 0 and a great augmentation of the political
activity of business entities and their satellite foundations
and think-tanks.8 1 There has been a major increase in
business lobbying, in the political activity of CEOs, in
electoral activity, and in the formation of organizations and
coalitions to carry these out.82 The thrust of much of this
has been to reduce or soften governmental regulation of
corporate activity. Governmental functions-prisons, police,
even military operations-have been farmed out to the
private sector. At the same time business corporations have
penetrated and patronized other institutions-schools,
universities, arts, healthcare, sports. Their presence has
been naturalized-they are not seen as inhabitants of the
specialized realm of production, but as institutions of civic
78. HENRY MINTZBERG, POWER IN AND AROUND ORGANIZATIONS 286 (1983).
79. See CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD'S
POLITICAL ECONOMIC SYSTEMS (1977).
80. See MARTIN SEYMOUR LIPSET & WILLIAM SCHNEIDER, THE CONFIDENCE
GAP: BUSINESS, LABOR, AND GOVERNMENT IN THE PUBLIC MIND (1987).
81. On the rise of think tanks, see THOMAS BYRNE EDSALL, THE NEW
POLITICS OF INEQUALITY 117-20 (1984). See also DAVID M. RICCI, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN POLITICS: THE NEW WASHINGTON AND THE RISE OF
THINK TANKS (1993).
82. See DAVID VOGEL, FLUCTUATING FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL POWER OF
BUSINESS IN AMERICA (1989); see also EDSALL, supra note 81, at 107-41; KEVIN
PHILLIPS, WEALTH AND DEMOCRACY: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN RICH
(2003).
20061 1399
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
life. They have discarded their old names based on their
work (e.g., AT&T, Standard Oil) to become Verizon or
Exxon, sonorous invocations of institutional dynamism.
Formerly, public spaces might be named after heroic figures
or public benefactors; now it has come to seem natural for
stadiums and parks to be named after corporations. As civic
actors, corporations occupy some of the space left by the
contraction of civic participation by individuals through
voluntary associations, at the same time as those
associations become more corporate and less
participatory. 83
Corporate parties are not merely part of the clientele of
unchanging adjudicative institutions. In important ways,
the increasing presence of APs transforms the institutions
of adjudication. Meir Dan-Cohen argues that as courts
encounter more organizational parties, their decision-
making shifts from an arbitral model focusing on
retrospective examination of "a self-contained private
[dispute] . . .involving exclusively the rights and interests
of the contending parties" to a regulation model that seeks
prospectively to "shape the form of future transactions and
interactions" among a whole category of parties.8 4 The shift
that Dan-Cohen describes has impressed other observers as
well.8 5  "Since organizations augment the social
ramifications of judicial decisions, they incline the judge
toward the regulatory mode. '8 6 As the ratio of general-to-
specific effects increases, courts shift from an arbitral to a
regulatory style.8 7 The presence of organizations makes
83. See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000).
84. MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS, AND ORGANIZATIONS: A LEGAL
THEORY FOR BUREAUCRATIC SOCIETY 128 (1986).
85. See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89
HARv. L. REV. 1281 (1976); see also Horwitz, supra note 3.
86. DAN-COHEN, supra note 84, at 128. If we distinguish the outcomes of
judicial action as either special effects (i.e., on the parties involved) or general
effects (i.e., on wider audiences, including potential parties), we can translate
the shift from arbitral to regulatory style as an increase in the ratio of general
to special effects. Marc Galanter, The Radiating Effects of Courts, in EMPIRICAL
THEORIES ABOUT COURTS 117 (K. Boyum & L. Mather eds., 1983).
87. On the distinction between special effects (i.e., impacts on the parties
before the court) and general effects (i.e., impacts on others), see Galanter,
supra note 86, at 117, 124-27.
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courts more future-oriented, more managerial, more
utilitarian, and generally more "legislative." But this in
turn raises the stakes in any given litigation and confers
additional advantage on those parties that can plan and
invest accordingly.88
The regulatory shift is evidenced in a set of interlinked
changes that are pervasive in American courts. There are
fewer trials-not just fewer as a percentage of all
terminations-but fewer absolutely. For example, although
the number of civil filings in the federal district courts has
increased by a factor of five since 1962, the number of civil
trials has decreased by thirty-two percent.8 9 Comparable
declines are found in state courts and in criminal as well as
civil trials. The decline in trials is accompanied by the rise
of managerial judging, with intensive pre-trial supervision
of cases, more terminations by pre-trial adjudication (e.g.,
summary judgment, motions to dismiss), judicial promotion
of settlements, and the embrace of Alternative Dispute
Resolution.90 Legislators and judges, beguiled by tales of a
litigation explosion and overuse of the courts, incline to
restricting access to the courts. But these restrictions are
88. For a classic discussion, see Stewart Macaulay's description of litigation
between the automobile manufacturers and their dealers. Macaulay, supra note
20, at 99-101.
89. In 1962, some 5802 cases in the Federal District Courts terminated
"during or after trial" making up 11.5% of dispositions. In 2004, the
corresponding figure was 3951 (just 1.7% of all dispositions). See
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD
STATISTICS: MARCH 31, 2004, tbl. C-4 (2004), http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload
2004/tables/CO4MarO4.pdf. The Administrative Office (AO) counts as a trial "a
contested proceeding before a jury or court at which evidence is introduced."
Federal Judicial Center, 2003-2004 District Court Case-Weighing Study app. F
(2004), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsfllookup/CaseWtsF.pdf/$file/CaseWtsF.
pdf (Form JS-10). The definition of trial varies in the state courts. See Marc
Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters
in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 533-34 tbl.A-2
(2004). In sorting out terminations, the AO's record-keeping category is cases
terminated "during or after trial," so the number of trials counted includes cases
that settle during trial and some evidentiary proceedings that do not lead to
judgments. So, the count here is not a count of completed trials but of cases that
reach the trial stage. These figures provide an inexact but useful indicator of
both the magnitude and year-to-year-trends in trial activity. For a full
discussion of the counting of trials problems, see Galanter, supra, at 475-76.
90. See Galanter, supra note 89; Judith Resnik, Migrating, Morphing and
Vanishing: The Empirical and Normative Pussles of Declining Trial Rates in
Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 783 (2004).
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not broadside; they target the claims of NPs, not those of
organizations. 91 A recent and poignant example is the
September 1lth Victim Compensation Fund which removed
the claims of natural persons from the legal system.
Individuals were given (generous) scheduled compensation
but were deprived of any forum for their potentially
embarrassing non-monetary claims, while the APs-
airlines, airport authorities, security firms, insurance
companies, and governmental units-were protected from
any legal accountability to NPs. But the act made "no effort
to divert property damage, business disruption, or
insurance subrogation claims out of the legal system. '92
NPs may depart the courts along various paths-by
judicial outsourcing to auxiliaries or ADR forums, by
conscription into captive tribunals by mandatory
arbitration clauses, 93  by contractual confinement to
"internal" tribunals within APs. 94 Bryant Garth describes
the evolution of a "segmented and hierarchical" system in
which "high stakes business disputes" enjoy "a full array of
alternatives" including courts and elite ADR providers,
91. Current examples include restrictions on class actions (Class Action
Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005); John F. Harris, Victory
For Bush On Suits; New Law to Limit Class-Action Cases, WASH. POST, Feb. 18,
2005, at Al) and proposed limits on medical malpractice claims. Steve Lohr,
Bush's Next Target: Malpractice Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2005, § 3, at 1
(describing Bush administration legislation that would cap non-economic
damages in malpractice suits at $250,000 and limit attorneys' fees). Early this
year, the Department of Health and Human Services proposed to restrict trials
of Medicare claims: hearings will be shifted from 140 Social Security offices
around the country to just four sites; most hearings will be held by
teleconference or telephone and those beneficiaries who insist on a face-to-face
hearing will waive their right to receive a decision within ninety days. Robert
Pear, Medicare Change Will Limit Access to Claim Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
24, 2005, at 1.
92. Gillian K. Hadfield, The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund: "An
Unprecedented Experiment in American Democracy," in THE FUTURE OF
TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE (forthcoming 2005), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=690401.
93. On the increasing prevalence of adhesive mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration clauses, see Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is
It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631 (2005); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print
to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of
Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WiS. L. REV. 33.
94. Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Suchman, When the "Haves"Hold Court:
Speculations on the Organizational Internalization of Law, 33 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
941 (1999).
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while ordinary litigants are pushed into "settlement-
oriented ADR processes dominated by quick-and-dirty
arbitration and by mediation conducted by private
individuals accountable neither through review processes
nor appeal."95
Individuals with their passions and their occasional
appetite for vindication, 96 for establishing truth, and for
challenging authority, are eased out of the courts, which
become more focused on economic claims. Policies designed
to pressure parties to settle (like F.R.C.P. Rule 68)
"delegitimatize all noneconomic motives associated with
litigation. ' 97 In such an environment, repeat-players can
use settlement strategy to vitiate the production of
precedent favorable to claimants, who are reasonably
equivalent to NPs. As full-blown contest over non-economic
principles is squeezed out, law is "de-moralized"-as
signified by the invariable qualifier in all settlements that
the defendant does not admit any wrongdoing. This feature
of our legal system is neatly displayed in a New Yorker
cartoon by Lee Lorenz, who anticipated by fifteen years the
Global Tobacco Settlement which said in effect, we'll give
you $300 billion but there is no admission of any
wrongdoing.
95. Bryant G. Garth, Tilting the Justice System: From ADR as Idealistic
Movement to a Segmented Market in Dispute Resolution, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
930, 932 (2002).
96. Individual litigants vary in the extent to which they seek justice or
moral vindication instead of, or in addition to, a satisfactory solution to their
immediate discomforts. A survey of Detroit residents found that the proportion
of respondents reporting serious problems who sought justice or vindication was
tiny in all areas other than discrimination. Leon Mayhew, Institutions of
Representation, 9 LAW & Soc'¥ REV. 401, 413 (1975). A study of the Illinois
Attorney General's Consumer Fraud Bureau found that the desire for "public-
oriented" remedies as opposed to private relief varied directly with income level.
Only 4% of those with incomes of less that $12,000 requested a public remedy,
in contrast to 28% of those with incomes over $17,000. Eric Steele, Fraud,
Dispute and the Consumer: Responding to Consumer Complaints, 123 U. PA. L.
REV. 1107, 1140 (1975).
97. Frank B. Cross, In Praise of Irrational Plaintiffs, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 1,
29 (2000).
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"I accept the four thousand years in Limbo with the understanding
that it in no -way constitutes an admission of wrongdoing."
Source: © The New Yorker Collection 1983 Lee Lorenz from
cartoonbank.com. All rights reserved.
V. CULTURAL INDULGENCE
In addition to these structural advantages, APs enjoy
"cultural" advantages in the legal forum. For more than a
century American courts have been receptive to the notion
that corporate actors are persons or entities with rights of
their own rather than merely creatures of the state or
instruments of NPs.98 Corporations are "persons" for
purposes of enjoying the protection of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. 99
98. See Mayer, supra note 3; Schane, supra note 3; DONALD L. HOROWITZ,
THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977).
99. See, e.g., Santa Clara County v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886);
Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889); Smyth v.
Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898). These late nineteenth-century decisions displaced
earlier jurisprudence denied that corporations were "persons" or "citizens" and
viewed them as groups or partnerships. See also Mayer, supra note 3; Schane,
supra note 3; HOROWITZ, supra note 98.
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Commercial corporations enjoy the same freedom of the
press as do individuals under the First Amendment.10 0
In a string of decisions since the mid-1970s, the
Supreme Court has conferred on corporations significant
Bill of Rights protections involving double jeopardy, 101
search and seizure,1 0 2 and, most importantly, free speech
protection for corporate political spending and
advertising.103 One commentator characterized these
opinions as symbolic of "the transformation of our
constitutional system from one of individual freedoms to
one of organizational prerogatives."10 4
Within the legal profession, the greatest prestige is
enjoyed by those who represent large corporations. 10 5
Mirroring the prestige structure of the bar, many judges
think that big-dollar commercial cases are what properly
deserve the attention of courts and the routine matters of
individuals are "junk cases" that should be addressed
elsewhere. As noted earlier, appellate judges are inclined to
think that they must protect corporate defendants against
misguided claimants and prejudiced juries.10 6
But the warm feelings of judges for the corporate world
are not reciprocated. Although corporations have in recent
years increasingly used litigation as a strategic tool in
managing business relationships, they have not embraced
the courts. John Lande, who interviewed senior executives
of publicly-held firms about their views, found that
[m]ost said they were dissatisfied with the results in their
experience with litigation and even more were dissatisfied with
the process. Most believe that the courts are not sensitive to the
needs of business. Many had doubts about the process of finding
the facts, especially when juries make the decisions, and
questioned the fairness of court outcomes. They were virtually
unanimous that there has been a litigation explosion, and the vast
100. See Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936).
101. See U.S. v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564 (1976).
102. See Marshall v. Barlow's Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1977).
103. See First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1976).
104. Mayer, supra note 3, at 578.
105. See infra text accompanying notes 121-23.
106. See supra text accompanying note 65.
2006] 1405
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
majority believed that most suits by individuals against
businesses are frivolous.10 7
Although they enjoy an array of rights, corporations are
largely immune from criminal punishment.10 They can't be
imprisoned, and it is difficult to use fines effectively to deter
corporate wrongdoing, for most corporate crimes are
difficult to recognize and easy to conceal. The high stakes
mean that adequate deterrence would require that fines be
astronomical to achieve deterrence. 10 9 And fines have the
disadvantage in that the effects are likely to fall on
innocent parties-low level workers, customers,
stockholders. 110 So, except in the glare of scandal, corporate
organizations tend to be regulated in a sort of "restorative"
mode that has gone out of fashion in dealing with
individual offenders. On the other hand, corporate actors
are frequent and successful users of the criminal justice
system to punish offenses against themselves."'
Rather than chastening, many of the follies and
blunders of corporations are deemed worthy of solace in the
form of tax deductions. 112 Corporations enjoy a relative
impunity to moral condemnation for single-minded pursuit
of advantage that would be condemned as unworthy if done
107. John Lande, Failing Faith in Litigation? A Survey of Business Lawyers
and Executives' Opinions, 3 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 51 (1998). The thrust of
Lande's findings is confirmed in other survey evidence. For example, a 1992
survey of business executives by Business Week found that 62% felt that "the
U.S. civil justice system significantly hampers the ability of U.S. companies to
compete with Japanese and European companies." Mark N. Vaumus, The
Verdict From the Corner Office, Bus. WK., Apr. 13, 1992, at 66.
108. See Coffee, supra note 18.
109. Corporations can be punished by punitive damage awards, but such
awards are hedged with protections that are not available to bar harsh criminal
sentences for recidivist NPs. States may "freely consider extraterritorial
misconduct when sentencing criminal recidivists, [but] such freedom is absent
in the imposition of punitive damage awards." Wayne A. Logan, Civil and
Criminal Recidivists: Extraterritoriality in Tort and Crime, 73 U. CIN. L. REV.
1609, 1626 (2005).
110. See Coffee, supra note 18, at 390.
111. See John Hagan, The Corporate Advantage: A Study of the Involvement
of Corporate and Individual Victims in a Criminal Justice System, 60 Soc.
FORCES 993-94 (1982).
112. See Reed Abelson, Tax Reformers, Take Your Mark, N.Y. TIMES, Feb.
11, 1996, § 3, at 12.
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by NPs. (For example, changes in residence or status to
secure tax advantages, or relocating assets to avoid
liability.) While individuals who invoke the legal system
arouse suspicion and reproach, 113 corporate actors are
rarely condemned for aggressively using litigation in
pursuit of their interests. 114 (Compare the outrage at the
McDonalds coffee spill case with the sanguine response to
the Texaco-Pennzoil award.)115
Being seen as a "tool" of corporations was once
stigmatizing to lawyers. Back in 1910, Woodrow Wilson
noted that "the country . . .distrusts every 'corporation
lawyer' [and] supposes him in league with persons whom it
has learned to dread, to whom it ascribes a degree of
selfishness which in effect makes them public enemies ...
[The lawyer] stands stoutly on the defensive." 116 Theron G.
Strong, a lawyer contemporary of Wilson, who kept a
wonderful journal through the years when modern
corporate practice emerged, disdainfully described the
subservience of lawyers to their corporate masters. Lawyers
on annual retainers to corporations, Strong thought,
become little more than a paid employee[s] bound hand and foot to
the service of [the corporation] . . . [the lawyer] is almost
completely deprived of free moral agency and is open to at least
the inference that he is virtually owned and controlled by the
client he serves. 1 17
Throughout much of the twentieth century, the large
firm that serves corporate clients was portrayed as the
exemplary site of legal professionalism, where lawyers
113. See David Engel, The Oven Bird's Song: Insiders, Outsiders, and
Personal Injuries in an American Community, 18 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 551, 553-54
(1984); Valerie P. Hans, The Jury's Response to Business and Corporate
Wrongdoing, 52 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 177 (1989); HANS, supra note 10, at 22-
49.
114. See Ross E. Cheit, Corporate Ambulance Chasers: The Charmed Life of
Business Litigation, in STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 119-20 (Austin
Sarat & Susan S. Silbey eds., 1991).
115. See Edward 0. Laumann & John P. Heinz, Specialization and Prestige
in the Legal Profession:Tthe Structure of Deference, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J.
155.
116. Woodrow Wilson, The Lawyer and the Community, 192 N. AM. REV.
604, 620 (1910).
117. THERON G. STRONG, LANDMARKS OF A LAWYER'S LIFETIME 353-54 (1914).
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exercise their autonomy to restrain the unreasonable or
anti-social demands of clients. But research suggests that
large corporate firm lawyers may have less autonomy vis-a-
vis their clients than lawyers in smaller practices. Robert
Nelson concluded that
the notion that lawyers struggle with clients over fundamental
questions about the common good is simply wrong . . . in general
large firm lawyers strive to maximize the substantive interest of
their clients within the boundaries of legal ethics. 118
Many believe that the large firm sector was once populated
by lawyer statesmen who induced corporate clients to
refrain from acting against the public interest. 119 Stuart
Speiser tested these claims by examining the biographies
and collected papers of reputed lawyer statesmen and the
published histories of leading law firms found that they
contained no evidence of any instance or policy of such
counseling. Such "client purification," he concluded, was "a
pure myth" and "merely wishful thinking . . . there never
was such an operating tradition."'120 Lawyering by leading
firms in deals giving rise to the corporate scandals of recent
years has not allayed concern about lawyer independence of
powerful clients.
Lawyers are more comfortable with corporations than is
the public at-large. As more of their work and income comes
from corporate sources, the disparity has widened. In 1975,
Heinz and Laumann found, Chicago lawyers were
"considerably more supportive of big business than . . .the
general population." By 1995 the difference was
accentuated. "Three-quarters of [a sample of the national
population] adopted the position that large companies had
too much power-the same percentage as in 1975." But only
118. ROBERT L. NELSON, PARTNERS WITH POWER: THE SOCIAL
TRANSFORMATION OF THE LARGE LAW FIRM 258-59 (1988). A review of recent
literature reports a decline in the autonomy of large firm lawyers. John M.
Conley and Scott Baker, Fall from Grace or Business as Usual? A Retrospective
Look at Lawyers on Wall Street and Main Street, 30 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 783,
814-15 (2005).
119. See, e.g., ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE
LEGAL PROFESSION (1993).
120. Stuart M. Speiser, Trial Balloon: Sarbanes-Oxley and the Myth of the
Lawyer-Statesman, 32(1) LITIGATION 5, 67, 69 (2005).
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31% of Chicago lawyers held this view in 1995, down from
52% in 1975.
Table 4. Portion who believe large companies have too much power
National Chicago
population lawyers
1975 78% 52%
1995 75% 31%
Source: JOHN HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW SOCIAL
STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 199-200 (2005).
Those who are best served by lawyers and the legal
system hold them in low esteem. Their lawyers, however,
are rewarded not only by higher incomes, but by standing
within the legal profession. Heinz and Laumann reported
that the prestige ranking of legal fields mirrors the
structural division of the profession, "with fields serving big
business clients at the top and those serving individual
clients (especially clients from lower socioeconomic groups)
at the bottom."121 "The higher a specialty stands in its
reputation for being motivated by altruistic (as opposed to
profitable) considerations, the lower it is likely to be in the
prestige order."'1 22 This was in 1975. Twenty years later
they observed that the prestige order had "undergone a
crystallization." From 1975 to 1995 the disparity between
the highly prestigious corporate fields and the less
prestigious individual- service fields increased. Prestige was
located in "fields serving large and powerful organizations."
Contrariwise, "the more a field is oriented toward public
service, rather than profit, the lower its prestige.'' 23 The
accentuation of hierarchy in professional prestige reflects
more general changes in the representation of status
hierarchies, in the spread of "winner-take-all" reward
121. HEINZ & LAUMANN, supra note 30, at 127.
122. Laumann & Heinz, supra note 115, at 202.
123. All of the above from JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW
SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 81-89 (2005).
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structures, 124 and the displacement of indistinct strata by
avowedly precise ordinal rankings (like U.S. News & World
Report's law school rankings and the American Lawyer's
ranking of law firms)-a development in virtually every
field of endeavor.
VI. PUBLIC AMBIVALENCE ABOUT THE DISTRIBUTIVE TILT OF
THE LAW
Wider publics have a different take on the legal pre-
eminence of corporate actors. That those with superior
fiscal and organizational resources enjoy advantages in
litigation has been appreciated by most observers (not just
on the left) for a long time.125 Although survey researchers
seem to avoid asking questions about organizational
potency per se, the responses to their questions about
treatment of rich and poor reveal a sanguine public
124. See ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIP J. COOK, THE WINNER TAKE ALL SOCIETY
(1995).
125. From then-ex-President William Howard Taft's 1908 talk to the
Virginia Bar Association:
[E]verything which tends to prolong or delay litigation . . . is a great
advantage for that litigant who has the longer purse. The man whose
all is involved in the decision of the lawsuit is much prejudiced in a
fight through the courts, if his opponent is able, by reason of his means,
to prolong the litigation and keep him for years out of what really
belongs to him. The wealthy defendant can almost always secure a
compromise or yielding of lawful rights because of the necessities of the
poor plaintiff.
William Howard Taft, The Delays of the Law, 18 YALE L.J. 28, 33 (1908).
Taft stresses that it is not judicial bias but institutional structure that
confers advantages on the rich:
The complaints that the courts are made for the rich and not for the
poor have no foundation in fact in the attitude of the courts upon the
merits of any controversy which may come before them, for the judges
of this country are as free from prejudice in this respect as it is possible
to be. But the inevitable effect of the delays incident to the machinery
now required in the settlement of controversies in judicial tribunals is
to oppress and put at a disadvantage the poor litigant and give great
advantage to his wealthy opponent.
Id. at 35. In contemporary work Taft's notion of "rich" parties has been
elaborated by what some have called "party capability theory," which
analyzes the systemic advantages enjoyed by parties that have greater
resources, are recurrent players, and are organizations. See, e.g.,
McCormick, Party Capability Theory, supra note 69; Atkins, Party
Capability Theory, supra note 69.
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estimation that the legal system is biased in favor of the
"haves." Thirty years ago, 59% of a national sample agreed
that "the legal system favors the rich and powerful over
everyone else."'126 Twenty years ago, when asked whether
"[tihe justice system in the United States mainly favors the
rich" or "treats all Americans as equally as possible," 57% of
respondents chose the "favored the rich" response and only
39% the "equally" response. 127 In a 1995 survey conducted
by U.S. News & World Report, fully three-quarters of the
respondents thought that the American legal system affords
less access to justice to "average Americans" than to rich
people-and four out of five of these thought "much less.' 128
In August 1998, only 33% of respondents to a national
survey thought "[c]ourts try to treat poor people and
wealthy people alike." But 90% agreed that "[w]ealthy
people or companies often wear down their opponents by
dragging out the legal proceedings."'129 Half-a-year later in
another national survey, 80% of respondents thought that
the "wealthy" receive better treatment from the courts than
do other people and two-thirds agreed that "[w]hen a person
sues a corporation, the courts generally favor the
126. BARBARA A. CURRAN, THE LEGAL NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC 234 (1977). The
survey interviews were conducted in March, 1974. Id. at 10.
127. ABC News/Washington Post Survey 1985 (USACWP.196.R24) (on file
with author).
128. Stephen Budiansky et al., How Lawyers Abuse the Law, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Jan. 30, 1995, at 50. The same poll shows the public placing
responsibility for this imbalance squarely on lawyers. Respondents were asked:
Here are some things that people say about lawyers. Which one of the
following comes closest to your views?
Lawyers have in important role to play in holding wrongdoers
accountable and helping the injured
Lawyers use the legal system to protect the powerful and get rich.
Press Release, U.S. News & World Report, Americans Have Mixed Feelings
About the Legal Reforms Contained in the House Republicans' Contract with
America (Jan. 21, 1995) (on file with author). Fifty-six percent affirmed the
"protect the powerful and get rich" response; only 35% the "helping" response.
Id.
129. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S. JUSTICE SYSTEM
65, 114 tbl.4 (1999), available at http://www.abanet.org/media/perception/
perceptions.pdf. This 90% response, quite uniform across demographic groups,
is the closest to unanimity of any response to any item in a lengthy survey,
outranking complaints about delay, expense, and leniency toward criminals.
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corporation over the person."130 I think it is fair to conclude
that wide sections of the American public share an
enduring sense that legal institutions, whether
intentionally or inadvertently, operate to amplify the
advantages of "haves" in general, including corporations. 131
Yet this awareness is only part of the legal culture of
the American public. Large sections of the public subscribe
to a complex of beliefs about law, lawyers, and lawsuits that
I have elsewhere called the "jaundiced view." By this I refer
to the familiar beliefs that the U.S. is overflowing with
frivolous litigation, brought by self-styled victims and
inspired by greedy lawyers, and encouraged by
irresponsible juries and activist judges. In this "litigation
lottery," claimants walk away with immense and
undeserved sums. Useful business and civil activities are
inhibited. The system is out of control and causes immense
damage, undermining the country's economic strength and
unraveling the fabric of trust that underlies civic life. Space
permits only a single example, whose authorship (by a
lawyer who subsequently was elevated to Solicitor General
of the United States) testifies to the respectability as well
as the audacity of such fulminations.
Our mechanism for the peaceable resolution of civil disputes has
transmogrified into an insatiable organism that is devouring a
segment of our society and culture from the inside-out. Like the
giant underground fungus discovered several years ago in
Michigan, which manifests itself above the ground only in the form
of an occasional mushroom, our civil justice system parasite is
barely perceptible to the average person on a day-to-day basis,
except for the occasional but increasingly frequent news reports of
a freakish lawsuit or outlandish jury verdict. But the destructive
130. National Center for State Courts, How the Public Views the State
Courts: A 1999 National Survey, Presented at the National Conference on
Public Trust and Confidence in the Justice System (May 14, 1999),
www.ncsconline.org/wc/publications/res-amtptc-publicviewcrtspub.pdf.
131. A 1995 survey of Iowans (n=803) slices things a bit finer than the
national surveys cited above. Respondents were asked which groups are treated
better or worse than others in the courts. 82.8% thought wealthy people were
treated better and 80.1% thought "big business" was treated better. The only
other groups that were thought to be so favored were politicians (77.5%) and
celebrities (83.7%). About 2% of respondents thought each of these groups was
treated worse than others. Iowa Supreme Court Survey Questions and
Responses in DAVID ROTTMAN, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE
COURT SURVEYS ON PUBLIC TRUST AND CONFIDENCE 59 (1998).
1412 [Vol. 53
2006] PLANET OF THE APs 1413
process is nevertheless continuously at work, growing and
relentlessly consuming vital resources and disabling our
productive capacity. 132
The jaundiced view flourishes most luxuriantly among
corporate and governmental elites, but many elements of it
have been embraced by wider publics. It is supported by a
web of stories about abusive lawsuits, frivolous claims, and
outrageous awards. 133 One of the salient features of this
discourse is that it depicts upstanding, beneficent
corporations and governments being exploited by rapacious
individuals and their lawyers. The master narrative is that
opportunistic plaintiffs who harm themselves by acting
irresponsibly and then attempt to fasten responsibility on
beneficent organizations and secure undeserved
compensation are "the source and carriers of [a] devastating
social disease. ' 134 These stories and the discourse in which
they are embedded are disseminated by a massive
campaign to impugn the legal system"135 and delegitimize
claimants and their lawyers who use the system against
APs. This propaganda campaign is promoted by
corporations and their political allies, supported by right-
wing foundations and think tanks, and has enjoyed great
success in resisting debunking. William Haltom and
Michael McCann propose that the jaundiced view is so
resilient because it is constantly confirmed and reinforced
132. Theodore B. Olson, The Parasitic Destruction of America's Civil Justice
System, 47 SMU L. REV. 359 (1994). Further examples may be found in Marc
Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends About the Civil Justice
System, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 717 (1998). See also WILLIAM HALTOM & MICHAEL
MCCANN, DISTORTING THE LAW: POLITICS, MEDIA, AND THE LITIGATION CRISIS
(2004).
133. See Galanter, supra note 132, at 720, 726-33; see also HALTOM &
MCCANN, supra note 132, at 155-56. All or virtually all of these stories have
long been exposed as fabrications or, at best, misrepresentations. See Robert M.
Hayden, The Cultural Logic of a Political Crisis: Common Sense, Hegemony,
and the Great American Liability Insurance Famine of 1986, in STUDIES IN LAW,
POLITICS AND SOCIETY 104, 104-08 (1991); Stephen Daniels, The Question of
Jury Competence and the Politics of Civil Justice Reform: Symbols, Rhetoric and
Agenda-Building, 52 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 269 (1989); Steven Brill & James
Lyons, The Not-So-Simple Crisis, AM. LAW., May 1986, at 1; Gail Diane Cox,
Tort Tales Lash Back, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 3, 1992, at 1; Fred Strasser, Tort Tales:
Old Stories Never Die, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 16, 1987, at 39.
134. HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 132, at 59.
135. Id. at 223. See generally DANIELS & MARTIN, supra note 76, at 43-51.
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by the conventions of news reportage in the mass media.
Corporate propaganda and media reportage combine to
project the "reigning common sense" about the legal
system. 136 The APs' success on the legal front in the culture
wars has succeeded in neutralizing the public's great fund
of cynical knowledge about the tilt of the legal system and
its appreciation of the legal dominance of APs.
VII. CONCLUSION
In describing the ascendancy of the APs in the legal
arena, I don't mean to portray the judicial system as one in
which individuals never prevail or obtain vindication. What
I have tried to describe is a structural and cultural setting
that seems to be growing over time. Thanks to growth-
inducing supplements, the seven-footers are becoming
eight-footers. For almost half a century, starting in the days
of the New Deal, the enactment of new rights, the
development of more favorable judicial doctrine, the
emergence of a more proficient plaintiffs bar, and
increasing awareness of the possibility of legal redress
enabled individuals to be more successful in using the
courts to secure remedies against corporate actors than
they were earlier. 137 We moved away from the pre-World
War Two world of infrequent and inadequate compensation
described by Friedman, Russell, and Bergstrom, and
displayed in the response to the Triangle Fire or the Hawk's
Nest Disaster, 138 to a world in which liability is regularly if
unevenly imposed on APs at the instance of NP claimants.
NPs were able to exert control over APs through enactment
of new rights, imposition of liability by courts, and
136. HALTOM & MCCANN, supra note 132, at 177, 297.
137. On the broadening of remedy in the preceding period, see Marc
Galanter, The Turn Against Law: the Recoil Against Expanding Accountability,
81 TEx. L. REV. 285 (2002). See also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, TOTAL JUSTICE 53-
67 (1985).
138. RANDOLPH E. BERGSTROM, COURTING DANGER: INJURY AND LAW IN NEW
YORK CITY, 1870-1910 (1992); Lawrence M. Friedman, Civil Wrongs: Personal
Injury Law in the Late 19th Century, 1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 351; Lawrence
M. Friedman & Thomas D. Russell, More Civil Wrongs: Personal Injury
Litigation, 1901-1910, 34 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 295 (1990). For an overview of the
treatment of disasters before and after World War II, see Marc Galanter,
Bhopals, Past and Present: The Changing Legal Response to Mass Disaster, 10
WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUSTICE 151 (1990).
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responsive administrative regulation, reinforced by
mounting cultural expectations of remedy and protection.
But about thirty years ago the legal world underwent a
climate change, The cultural supports for enhanced
accountability were weakened by distrust of government
and the exaltation of the market. Regulation is enfeebled
and liability in particular is threatened by a massive recoil
against enhanced accountability ("tort reform" to curtail
remedies by caps, to restrict access by regulating
contingency fees and class actions) and a sustained public
campaign to disparage and weaken the civil justice system
while demonizing lawyers, especially those who represent
individuals in their battles with APs-"tort lawyers,"
"contingency fee lawyers," "class action lawyers." But the
onus tends to rub off on all lawyers, who are regarded as
undermining prosperity and unraveling the fabric of social
life. 139 In a historic reversal from the time that lawyers
were viewed as pillars of the establishment, such anti-
lawyer attitudes are particularly prevalent among "top
people"-those with more education, higher incomes, and
more prestigious occupations. 140
The legal forum, increasingly dominated by APs,
becomes more amenable to economic policing and less
hospitable to dramas of moral vindication. The role of moral
outrage and human solidarity and empathy are undercut by
campaigns to limit remedies for NPs. The stakes in these
struggles are escalating, because the potential for remedy
and protection is expanding, driven by advances in science,
technology, and social management. As more things are
capable of being done by human institutions, the line
between unavoidable misfortune and imposed injustice
shifts. Bioethicists Allen Buchanan, Dan W. Brock, Norman
Daniels, and Dan Wickler observe that
[t]he boundary between the natural and the social, and between
the realm of fortune and that of justice, is not static. What we have
139. On the public animus against lawyers, see MARC GALANTER, LOWERING
THE BAR: LAWYER JOKES AND LEGAL CULTURE (2005); Marc Galanter, Predators
and Parasites: Lawyer-Bashing and Civil Justice, 28 GA. L. REV. 633 (1994);
Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers in Public Opinion,
Jokes, and Political Discourse, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 805 (1998).
140. On the distribution of public estimation of lawyers, see PETER D. HART
RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, A SURVEY OF ATTITUDES NATIONWIDE TOWARD LAWYERS
AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM (1993).
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taken to be moral progress has often consisted in pushing back the
frontiers of the natural, in bringing within the sphere of social
control, and thereby within the domain of justice, what was
previously regarded as the natural, and as merely a matter of good
or ill fortune. 14 1
Once, having an incurable disease was an inalterable
misfortune; now a perception of insufficient vigor in
pursuing a cure or refusal to authorize an experimental
treatment can give rise to a claim of injustice. As the scope
of possible interventions broadens, more and more the
presence of avoidable bad things or the absence of
achievable good things are evaluated in terms of that
intervention. Thus famine or social subordination or a
flawed appearance is not inalterable fate, but a matter of
appropriate interventions. What was seen as fate may now
be seen as inappropriate policy. Advances in medical care
and biotechnology have creased a whole new realm of
justice issues concerning death, transplants, reproductive
technologies, stem cells, DNA, and so forth. Like medicine
and technology, law and policy enlarge both the supply of
answers and the supply of unanswered questions.
For the most part the advances in human capability
and control that drive the justice frontier are located in or
managed by APs, either corporations or governmental
bodies. By creating new capacities for intervention, they
produce new potential for regulation and remedy. But they
can use their agility as legal players to resist having their
responsibilities measured by heightened expectations that
reflect new technical possibilities. The capacity of legal
institutions to project and enforce norms that weigh and
balance the new possibilities of control will depend
primarily on the course of democratic politics. Widespread
public gullibility about representations of the civil justice
system induces pessimism. But the new possibilities for
intervention and control will impinge on and be appreciated
by the more educated and affluent, the very sectors of the
population most distracted by current misreadings of the
system.
141. ALLEN BUCHANAN, DAN W. BROCK, NORMAN DANIELS, & DAN WICKLER,
FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS AND JUSTICE 83 (2000); see also JUDITH N.
SHKLAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTICE 5, 51-82 (1990).
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James Coleman reminds us that "[t]he modern
corporate actor will not be the last social invention to be
made.... It will eventually be displaced."'142 Much the same
might be said of the present forms of courts and the legal
profession. At the moment it appears that APs are well on
their way to capturing the legal profession and
overwhelming or circumventing the courts. Whether the
APs can be tamed by the courts depends on the emergence
of a democratic politics that is informed by the public's
basic insight into dominance of APs and the distributive tilt
of the legal system. It will also depend on the inventiveness
of lawyers in coming up with new formats and devices for
making public policy and effectively controlling APs.
142. JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 552 (1990).
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